together with the British United Provident Association (BUPA) Hospital Cash Scheme and two schemes of the British Hospitals Contributory Schemes Association (BHCSA), form the subject matter of this study. 
PROFIT-MAKING SCHEMES

THE NON-PROFIT-MAKING SCHEMES
The British United Provident Association, a relative late-comer to the field of hospitalization insurance, announced its scheme in 1972. It is working in partnership with the Clerical Medical and General Life Assurance Society and their scheme is on offer to both existing members of BUPA and others. The constituent members of the BHCSA had in fact been first in the field. After the first world war, when the voluntary hospitals were in severe financial difficulties, their plight was investigated by the Voluntary Hospitals Committee under Viscount Cave (Ministry of Health, 1921) . This Committee reported in 1921 and as a result a scheme was laid before the British Hospitals Association. It was accepted that payments to hospitals should take the form of payments for services rendered and that a proportion of the contribution should be set aside for 'extra-hospital benefits'. These provide cash payments for contributors for such diverse purposes as dentures, spectacles, convalescence, attendance at out-patient departments, and maternity.
A typical scheme in the 1930s would cost the subscriber 3d. per week and would pay any hospital in which he was a patient £2 17s. 6d. per week. The schemes were limited to those earning less than £6 per week if married with dependants, and £4 if single (Hospital Saving Association, 1936) . With the coming of the National Health Service in 1948 the original purposes of the schemes, support for the hospitals and insurance against hospital fees, disappeared. However, a number of schemes whose funds were not tied to particular hospitals survived to form the present BHCSA (founded in 1948). These generally provide cash payments for contributors on being admitted to hospital, in addition to the extra hospital benefits mentioned above (Tables I and II) .
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
It was decided to examine the commercial and some of the non-profit-making schemes, and to compare the relative benefits obtainable for a number of typical household units of a given size and age structure. The tables of the Hospital In-patient Enquiry for 1970 (HIPE), the Mental Health Enquiry, and the Registrar General's Review for the same year were used to determine the risk that existed of hospitalization in the population as a continued on page 199 The standardized gross surplus used to compare the schemes is obtained by multiplying for an eligible cause the mean duration of stay (MDS) by the discharge rate (DR), which gives the annual bed days per person. This multiplied by the benefit rate (BR) gives the benefit liability (BL). These calculations are repeated for all relevant causes for each of the persons covered. If we subtract the total benefit liability from the premium (P) we obtain the gross surplus. This multiplied by 100 and divided by the premium gives the standardized gross surplus for an annual premium of £100 (for a worked example see Appendix 3).
The mean duration of stay in the HIPE tables is based on patient-spells in hospital, not on the length of time spent in hospital by individual patients. For example, a patient who had three spells in hospital in one year of 4, 10, and 11 days would be represented in the HIPE tables (e.g., table 9):
(1) by adding 25 days to the total number of days spent in hospital to be distributed over three spells (if there were no other spells to be accounted for in his age, marital status, and diagnostic grouping, we would therefore observe a mean duration of stay (spell) for this group of 8 3), and (2) by adding three more discharges to the number recorded. Continuing our example mentioned under (1), the discharge rate would be (3/Y) x 10,000 where Y is the total number of people in England and Wales in the age/marital status cohort under consideration.
Most schemes, however, place an upper limit on their liability to the subscriber or an insured member of the household unit. For this reason the calculation of the theoretical liability of the scheme for each eligible cause will tend to overestimate the actual liability.
The (M is derived in the absence of information to the contrary on the assumption that the proportion of married and unmarried is the same in psychiatric hospitals and units as among those being treated for psychiatric illness in general wards.)
All schemes known to us which do pay a benefit for mental disorder will not effectively accept liability for a stay of longer than one year. It is for this reason that NH refers to the number of people in psychiatric hospitals whose stay is less than one year. It can be seen that even this statistic will overestimate the theoretical liability because the maximum benefit allowed by any scheme is 26 weeks in any one year. Unfortunately, HIPE does not permit such an allowance to be made for patients with mental disorder whose stay is in a general hospital.
As both HIPE and the Mental Health Enquiry provide data only for relatively comprehensive age groups, linear interpolation has been used to calculate the liability of a scheme for a particular household unit (see Appendix 1). Most schemes exclude certain conditions, especially mental disorder and pregnancy (see Table I and Appendix 2). This has been allowed for in the tables. Two schemes (Hospital Plan and Gold Shield) exclude all patients in geriatric wards. At the same time Hospital Plan offers double benefits for patients with cancer or heart attack. We are informed, however, that patients with heart attack or cancer who happen to be placed in geriatric wards are excluded from benefits. Our data do not allow this condition to be taken into account. Pre-existing illness, variously defined, is excluded from several schemes either for a period or altogether. This cannot becalculated exactly and so has been ignored, as have the exclusions for alcoholism and drug addiction. The effect of ignoring these exclusions is to make the calculated resultant gross profit appear rather lower than it actually is in practice.
EsTIMATES OF STANDARDIZED GROSS SURPLUS
It can be seen from Tables III and IV that all schemes make a considerable profit on subscribers who are less than 35 on entry (assumed to be the male in the case of a family), except for the Sheffield and District scheme, and even here its only loss is for families where the male's age ranges from 20 It is interesting to note that for nearly every scheme the profit earned per subscriber does fall with an increase in the age of subscribers. To this extent the commercial schemes are countenancing a certain amount of cross-subsidization among age groups. The cross-subsidization implicit in many non-profit-making schemes is especially noticeable in the case of the Sheffield and District scheme. The London-based Hospital Savings Association Crown Plan manages to avoid a certain amount of crosssubsidization by providing a terminal grant for all causes associated with chronic conditions. Hospital Plan and Gold Shield Plan avoid a certain degree of cross-subsidization by excluding people hospitalized in geriatric wards. As nearly all schemes disallow pre-existing conditions and set an upper limit to the benefit payable, such measures are most likely to discriminate against the elderly and therefore reduce the effective cross-subsidization among age groups. The BHCSA schemes offer considerable benefits to subscribers over and above the in-patient grants. These include grants towards the cost of spectacles, dentures, home helps, etc. This, for instance, in the standard HSA scheme amounts to an extra 50% of the total benefits paid out for hospitalization (Hospital Saving Association, 1972) .
The estimates given above refer to standardized gross surpluses and not to profit margins.
Administration costs may be estimated to lie in the range of 10% to 25%, but it is not possible to be more precise as their fixed-cost element expressed as a percentage of premiums will vary according to the number of subscribers enrolled. The Sheffield and District scheme claim 145,000 subscribers (Sheffield and District Hospital and Convalescent Services Council Inc., 1972) . London and Edinburgh and Hospital Plan managements claim 50,000 each (Ennis, 1973) . It is reasonable to argue that there are economies of scale available to Sheffield and District which are not available to London and Edinburgh and Hospital Plan. Sheffield and District's administrative costs have fallen from 24 9% in 1957, when its membership was 27,177, to 11 *3 % when its membership in 1972 was 145,000 (Sheffield and District Hospital and Convalescent Services Council Inc., 1972) . Therefore more of the standardized gross surplus will be required to cover administrative costs for the two commercial schemes than for the Sheffield and District scheme.
The BHCSA schemes enjoy a tax advantage in that they have mutual status as non-profit-making organizations which do not pay tax on their excess of premium income over expenditure provided they conform to the limits prescribed in Sect. 345 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970. They do, however, pay tax on their investment income, and their advantage would be lost should they have a deficit.
One of the London and Edinburgh schemes offers a refund of premiums for an insured member if no claim is made within a 10-year period. The premiums for this scheme are among the highest we have discovered, and if an individual single man in the 25-34 age cohort were to invest his premiums to yield 5 % real growth the present value of the annual premiums of £22-80 invested would be £176 05 (= 22 80 x 7 72173, where 7-72173 is the present value of a 10-year annuity of £1). This compares with £139-97, which is the present value of the premiums on being refunded after a claim-free period. This latter figure, however, should be weighted by the probability of a given individual not being hospitalized over the 10-year period. We did not have access to record linkage data which would allow calculation of the probability of not being hospitalized. We have estimated this indirectly from age, sex, and marital status specific discharge rates.
Such an estimate cannot take account of the influence for an individual of his previous medical history.
The calculation of the expected value of the scheme to an individual was completed by weighting the present value of the benefits which he receives when hospitalized by the probability of being hospitalized. The expected value of the total refunded over a 10-year period for a single man in the 25-34 age range is £108 40.
Obviously this calculation is only illustrative from the point of view of an individual because it makes no allowance for his conditional probability deviating from that of the whole cohort. Also no allowance has been made for changes in medical practice or morbidity over the 10-year period. The same figures, however, when related to a scheme which has enrolled a broad cross-section of the community from this particular age-cohort, would yield a standardized gross surplus of £38 42 for a series of 10 annual premiums of £100. This figure should be compared with the one derived in Table  III of £85-48. For a full explanation of how these estimates were arrived at see Appendix 4.
DISCUSSION
Considerable doubts about the profit-making schemes have been voiced recently in the national press, and in March 1973 Michael Cocks, Member of Parliament for Bristol South, introduced a Bill under the 10-minute rule 'to prohibit insurance companies from offering cash payments for hospitalization only, rather than the full period of the illness suffered; and to require insurance companies advertising health or illness policies to publish prominently with such advertisements sufficient actuarial and other relevant information to enable the general public to reach a reasonable judgment on the value of such policies' (Hansard, 1973 One further point needs to be considered: the advantage to the patient of extra benefit for hospitalization due to cancer is questionable. Enquiries have shown that doctors do not generally tell their patients this diagnosis but cloak it in euphemisms. In a recent enquiry it was discovered that in only 13 % of a series of 279 people who died of cancer did the doctor discuss the diagnosis with the patient (Ward, 1973 ).
An interesting legal point arises here. Does a doctor whose patient has cancer and who would be able to claim extra benefits if hospitalized owe a duty to the patient to inform him of his condition? Lord Justice Edmund Davies, speaking extrajudicially(1973), has suggested that while generally no duty to inform a patient of his condition exists, nevertheless there may be circumstances in which he is legally obliged to tell ..... the whole truth and nothing but the truth'. He was speaking of cases in which patients might make certain property dispositions dependent on the doctor's diagnosis, but the present case appears to be analogous.
CONCLUSION
It is possible to gain some idea of the profits of the commercial schemes from the gross surpluses. These are over 90 % for some groups, and even with an administrative cost of 20% are still substantial. The estimates of gross surplus we have given are not based on the returns of the companies themselves but on the assumption that their subscribers are a fair cross-section and that their hospitalization pattern conforms to the average. It may be argued that given the current level of premiums the commercial schemes need a healthy surplus on their younger subscribers to cover the deficits which are incurred with older age groups. It might be maintained, therefore, that if the schemes were assessed over the lifetime of the subscriber the present value of the standardized year surplus would yield a rate of profit which is more normal for the insurance industry. In fact, for a single man who enrols at the age of 20 for 49 years, the present value (at a 5 % rate of interest) of the commercial scheme's standardized gross surplus income stream ranges from £909 63 to £1490-60 (see Table V ).
Another variant of this argument would admit that the profits are above normal taken over the lifetime of an individual, but would maintain that the current level of premiums is justified because of the element of self-selection. In other words, schemes are not likely to enrol a random sample of the entire population but rather a biased sample which includes more high-risk groups than normal, e.g., the elderly and the unmarried. The experience of some of the BHCSA schemes contradicts this view. For instance, the HSA scheme, according to our calculations, shows a relatively small theoretical profit, or even a deficit on some groups, and yet its published accounts are in a healthy state (Hospital Saving Association, 1972) . On this basis it would seem that if the actual profits of the commercial scheme were known they could be considerably higher. The interesting question which remains to be answered is why other insurance companies do not join the market. It is usually argued that competition among insurance companies serves to drive down profit rates, and yet this does not appear to have happened in this case. Is it due to the exercise of moral restraint on the part of the other companies? It must be noted, however, that more competitive rates leading to the enrolment of more people cannot necessarily be regarded as being 'a good thing' in the national context, because it may increase the demand for hospital beds.
The demand for these schemes may reflect attitudes and beliefs which are not necessarily appropriate today. As we have seen, the benefits to be gained on hospitalization are minimal compared with the total costs to the patient of illness-most of which occurs outside hospital.
We have already noted that for some (if not all) households the benefits payable could overcompensate them for the financial loss associated directly with the period of hospitalization. For this reason there will be an inducement for the insured to make an additional claim on the supply of scarce hospital beds. This feature raises an important issue as far as the National Health Service is concerned, especially at a time when the supply of hospital beds per head of the population is falling. This factor cannot be estimated on the basis of current data but would require further investigation.
Although this paper concentrates on commercial schemes, the non-profit-making BHCSA is now moving into areas of comparable benefits and their role may need to be re-assessed. Sir Keith Joseph, speaking at Wolverhampton in September 1971, suggested, for instance, that the areas of greatest need were no longer the acute but the chronic and geriatric patients (BHCSA, 1972) . There may be a case for enquiring into the schemes as a whole, bearing in mind the changed circumstances of the seventies. The members of BHCSA could, of course, extend their existing schemes to provide insurance for the full length of illness.* A more radical alternative would be to introduce contributory schemes whose specific aim would be to extend provision of community care for non-acute conditions. * At least one BHCSA scheme-the Bristol Contributory Welfare Association-offers a cash benefit of £3 per week for the contributor only for certificated illness at home payable from the fourth day of absence from work up to a maximum of the first 13 weeks of illness (after which £1 -50 per week is payable for the second 13 weeks of illness). The subscription is 30p weekly, which also entitles the contributor (and his spouse) to various other cash benefits including hospitalization benefit. Another scheme-Merseyside Hospitals Council-is also preparing to introduce benefit for illness at home in October 1973 (Dodd, 1972) . It is also interesting to note that the Bristol scheme offers attractive daily cash benefits for in-hospital stays (up to £7 -14 for subscribers seeking cover for themselves alone for a weekly subscription of 20p Tables, Population, Tables A2, A3 (a).
APPENDIX 2 ELIGIBLE AND INELIGIBLE CAUSES AND CONDMTONS
Where named conditions have been excluded from benefit, or treated differently, e.g., by being eligible for double benefit, an adjustment has been made as far as possible in the calculations. In cases when it has not been possible from the Hospital In-patient Enquiry tables to calculate exactly the element concerned, e.g., 'alcoholism', the particular cause has not been excluded from the calculations. This has the effect of over-stating the relevant company's liability and consequently understating its theoretical gross surplus. Table 9 of HIPE. Also psychiatric illness in psychiatric hospitals. (a) Includes 'Mental Disorders' in HIPE A69 to A71. (b) All patients in psychiatric hospitals as enumerated in Mental Health Enquiry. Includes all malignant neoplasms (A45-58) and leukaemia (A59). This is covered by acute myocardial infarction (A83a). HIPE A6 to A10. All tuberculosis. Includes persons in chronic sick and geriatric departments enumerated in Table 12 HIPE. It has not been possible to discover the proportion of chronic sick patients being nursed in other units. Table  12 does not differentiate by marital status; therefore it has been assumed that the spells enumerated are equally divided between married and non-married. There is no differentiation in the HIPE tables between maliciously self-administered poisons and accidental or iatrogenic intoxication. Consequently these conditions have not been subtracted. This is assumed to mean Conditions of pregnancy, childbirth and puerperium (Al 12-A118, Y60-Y61). Includes Toxaemia of pregnancy and puerperium (Al12), Haemorrhage of pregnancy and childbirth (A113), Other pregnancy complications (All7a), Other and unspecified abortions (A115), Other complications of childbirth or puerperium (A116, Al17b).
